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APPROPRIATION WATER LAW ELEMENTS IN
RIPARIAN DOCTRINE STATES
J. H.

BEUSCHER:*

IyHE FIELD of water law contains more than its fair share of judicial
over-generalizations. Water law discussions usually overemphasize these
case law broadsides. These discussions often ignore or understress, (1) comparative analysis of actual case results; (2) the gloss of administrative case
law being built up in day-to-day application of water laws by a state and
local agencies and (3) the actual law-in-action at the user level. This is true
of rules about diffused surface water and about ground water. It is especially
true of law which relates to the use of water in streams, lakes and ponds.
This in part accounts for the common habit of dividing the states of the
Union into two groups with states in each group supposedly applying a
common body of uniform doctrine, i.e., those states which apply the riparian
doctrine and those which enforce the appropriation doctrine.'
Over-generalization in the water law field based on judicial pronouncements not only tends to blur important distinctions between states which are
members of the same group, it also magnifies differences when states in one
group are compared with those in another. More important, over-generalization provides unstable footings upon which to erect changes in water laws-changes which are being sparked by rapid population increases and sharp
climbs in per capita water demand curves. Besides, proposals for legislative
firming up of water laws in humid states are being met by objections from
orthodox riparianists who insist that such proposals are but attempts to import
an alien law of appropriation from the dissimilar setting of the arid west. A
showing that some appropriation-like law is already with us in humid states
tends, for what it is worth, to blunt this head-on charge.
These are all reasons for encouraging greater specificity in approaching
the water laws of a given state and that is the purpose of this paper. The
method is to throw against the screen of doctrinal riparianism some actual
humid-state legislation and court and administrative adjudications to show
that there is much which does not square with pristine riparianism; that
some of this legislation and adjudication, as a matter of fact, smacks more of
western appropriation principles than of riparianism. I make no claim to
completeness. Drawing scattered illustrations largely from four states, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Indiana and Ohio, I hope for no more than to induce some
readers to take a more specific and critical look at water laws in other humid
states.
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
1. Actually there is a third group of states, those in which both riparian and
appropriation principles are consciously applied. These are the states which border the
arid west on the east and the west-the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas, Texas, California,
Oregon and Washington. The other western states are "appropriation" only. All states
east of the Mississippi are treated as riparian.
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The reason for the selection of the four states named lies in the fact that
I have been supervising research into their water laws We have looked not
only at the judicial pronouncements of private and public water rights doctrine
but also at state and local legislation and at the degree to which state and
local agencies have been molding and shaping water rights.
CLAIMED BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RIPARiAN AND APPROPRIATION
PRINCIPLES

The basic differences between riparian doctrine and appropriation principles, as usually stated, can be roughly summed up as follows:

Source of the
Water Right

Effect of
Nonuse

Place of Use

General
Nature of the
Water Right

Natural Flow

Riparian
The water right is tied to ownership
of land contiguous to the water
course. The water is, however, not
owned; the landowner has a "usufructuary" right only.
Rights to use water are not lost by
abandonment or nonuse. A riparian
who has not been using water may
at any time commence a use even
though this may require previous
users to reduce their withdrawals.
There is, however, the chance that
established users may get rights by
prescription.
Many riparian state cases indicate
that the water must be used on the
riparian land itself; others permit
use on nonriparian land as long as
other riparians are not measurably
harmed.
Riparians are thought of as correlative cosharers in a usufructuary
right to make reasonable use of
water; there is accordingly no fixed
quantity of water assured to any
riparian.

Earlier case law emphasized more
than current cases the natural flow
requirement of a waterwheel economy, namely that after using water
the riparian was to return it to the
watercourse so the water would flow
as it was "wont" to flow. 'Today
concepts of public rights or public
trust are more effective in preserving
minimum flows in streams or levels
in lakes.

Appropriation
Contiguity of land to the water
course is not a factor, rights are acquired by actual use. The first user
acquires the best right; the second
user, the second best, etc.
Nonuse of an appropriation right
may result in its loss by abandonment.

The appropriator may transport to,
and use the water on, nonriparian
land; in fact, use in another watershed is permitted.
The appropriator once he has established, his right by proof of earlier
use is titled to a specified quantity
of water as against appropriators
later in time. (Little attention is
paid to the fact that many water
users in the west actually depend for
their water upon a contract with an
irrigation district.)
There is no natural flow notion. The
appropriators can take as much
water as they are entitled to take
even though it exhausts the watercourse. It is this aspect of assumed
appropriation law which particularly arouses conservationists. Some
western states, however, permit the
states to file for and ultimately acquire a right to the unappropriated
flow and thus preserve such flow, if
desired.

2. This research has been carried out under a contract between the University of
Wisconsin and the Economic Research Service, Farm Economics Division, U.S.D.A.,
with Mr. Harold H. Ellis of the Agricultural Research Service as the contracting officer's
representative. Needless to say, the views expressed in this article are my own and do
not necessarily represent those of the contracting parties or of Mr. Ellis.
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A GLANCE BACK INTO ORIGINS or RPAwmNIsm
The first clear enunciations of riparian doctrine came in the age of the
mill, dam and the waterwheel. Water taken from a stream was passed over
the wheel and then returned to the stream, supposedly undiminished in quantity. Actually storage of the water in the mill pond meant some loss by
evaporation, but this was not stressed.
It was Justice Story sitting as a federal circuit judge who first clearly
set forth the elements of the riparian doctrine in Tyler v. Wilkinson.3 Actually
this was not a case in which adjudication of reasonable shares between cosharing riparians was in issue. Instead the case involved a conflict between a
group of lower riparians and a group of upper owners who claimed prescriptive
rights to water in a diversion ditch, based not upon riparian ownership as
such, but upon adverse use. Thus in this country's keystone riparian doctrine
case, one group of claimants were held to have fixed and ascertainable rights
to given quantities of water, even though they apparently were not riparian
to the watercourse. Nevertheless, Justice Story, in approaching this conflict,
announced certain fundamentals as follows:
1. He tied the right to use water to ownership of the shoreland and
stream bed and made it "an incident annexed, by operation of law,
to the land itself."
2. He made it clear that the landowner does not have "property in
the water itself," he has "but a simple use of it, while it passes
along." Just what practical consequences in case results flow from
this pretty distinction is not clear, but it has nevertheless been
repeated dozens of times by riparian state courts all over the land.
3. Then he set up a dilemma with an idealized horn-in-the-sky and
a common-sense horn closer to the practical affairs of life:
a. On the idealized side he says, (1) no proprietor has a right
to use water to the prejudice of another; (2) there is a
"perfect equality of right" in common to all proprietors and
(3) no one has a right to "diminish the quantity which will,
according to natural current, flow to a proprietor below."
b. On the common sense side, he hastily adds, (1) there may
be diminution, retardation or acceleration indispensable for
the reasonable use of the water, and (2) the law acts "with
a reasonable reference to public convenience and general
good, and it is not betrayed into a narrow strictness, subversive to common sense ....)4
Justice Story wrote in 1827. The following year Chancellor Kent picked
up Story's pronouncements and developed them in his famous Commentaries.5
Kent again stressed the idealized and the practical sides of the doctrine of
riparian water use, although, relying on French as well as Anglo-American
3. 24 Fed. Cas. 472 (Case No. 14,312 C. Ct. R.I. 1827).
4. Id. at 474.
5. III Kent, Commentaries, 439 (2d ed. 1832).
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authorities, he perhaps gave somewhat less emphasis to "reasonable use"
and somewhat more to "natural flow" than did Justice Story. It was Kent's
much-used book which was the principal source upon which American courts
subsequently drew in planting riparianism in the humid states of the Union.
His famous language is still much quoted:
Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a river, has naturally an
equal right to the use of the water which flows in the stream adjacent
to his lands, as it was wont to run (currere solebat), without diminution or alteration. 6
His common-sense qualification is phrased as follows:
Streams of water are intended for the use and comfort of man; and
it would be unreasonable, and contrary to the universal sense of
mankind, to debar every riparian proprietor from the application of
the water to domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes,
provided the use of it be made under the limitations which have been
mentioned; [to return it to its ordinary channel and not unreasonably to detain, not to give the water a new direction, and not to work
material injury or annoyance to his neighbor below].7
He adds,
...There will, no doubt, inevitably be, in the exercise of a perfect
right to the use of the water, some evaporation and decrease of it,
and some variations in the weight and velocity of the current.8
So in the case of both Justice Story and Chancellor Kent "the riparian
doctrine" is a two-level structure consisting of what some call the strict
natural flow doctrine on the high side and the reasonable use doctrine on the
low and applied side.
Riparian state courts have followed the lead of these two legal scholars
in this tendency to state the natural flow ideal and the practical reasonable
use standard together. But as Justice Holmes said, "General propositions do
not decide concrete cases." 9 When one looks at the actual decisions about
riparian rights being reached on the facts of tough, concrete cases, several
points quickly become evident:
1. The natural flow precept has been receiving less and less emphasis,
and many courts are today content to express riparian doctrine
solely or almost solely in terms of reasonable use between riparians with the effect upon flow as just one of the evidentiary
factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the use.
2. There is actually much more protection given to the prior user of
water as against a subsequent water claimant than one would
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 439.
Id. at 440.
Ibid.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
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have any reason to expect from a mere recitation of black-letter
riparianisms.
3. The decline in emphasis on natural flow is in part evident from
the substantial willingness of courts to permit water to be taken
from streams or lakes for use on nonriparian lands. More and
more the courts require a showing of measurable economic
detriment resulting from the diminished flow before giving judicial
relief.
SPEciFic DEVIATIONS FROM PRISTINE RiPARIANISM

1. The PrescriptiveRight
Kent recognized and Story enforced a major qualification upon correlative cosharing, namely, the vested prescriptive right based upon adverse use
over time. Since their day humid-state courts have declared over and over
again that a water user, be he riparian or nonriparian, may acquire a firm
prescriptive right on appropriate showing of open, notorious adverse use
continuously for the requisite period of time. These amount to uncompensated
transfers of rights from adversely affected riparians to the adverse users. The
adverse user acquires a right to a measurable quantity of water and this
right is not held in common with the riparian rights; it is individual to the
prescriptive holder and is unaffected by subsequent demands by riparians
who for the first time choose to draw or use water.10 Without getting involved
in the technical requirements for the establishment of a prescriptive water
right, suffice it to say that empirical investigations of water uses along some
of the busier rivers in the humid states would probably disclose a great many
of these fixed and enforcible rights standing firm and unyielding in a supposedly flexibly adjustable system of correlative cosharing.
2. The Right to Domestic Use
It is familiar black-letter law that a riparian may consume as much
water as is necessary, even to the exhaustion of the stream, to satisfy his do-2
mestic needs.' Domestic uses have been held to include water for drinking,'
cooking,' 3 laundry and sanitation,' 4 the maintenance and sustenance of the
proprietor and his family,' 5 possibly the watering of a home garden' 0 and
the watering of stock and other domestic animals, 17 but not including feeder
lot watering of animals greatly exceeding in number those which a riparian
10. See Ellis, "Some Legal Aspects of Water Use in North Carolina" in The Law
of Water Allocation in the Eastern United States 189, 336 (Conservation Found. 1958)
and Harnsberger, Prescriptive Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 47.
11. 6A American Law of Property § 28.57 (Casner ed. 1952).
12.
13.
14.

Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713 (1903).
Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903).
Salem Mills Co. v. Lord, 42 Ore. 82, 69 P. 1033, 70 P. 832 (1902).

16.

Ibid.

15.

Hough v. Porter, 51 Ore. 318, 98 P. 1083 (1909).

17. Martin v. Burr, 111 Tex. 57, 228 S.W. 543 (1921), Hough v. Porter, supra
note 15, and Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, supra note 13.
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could reasonably be expected to own.' Domestic uses are not apt to involve
great quantities of water, unless as has happened in Ohio the state court is
induced to extend the domestic use priority to all water taken by a municipal
water utility from a stream for household and manufacturing requirements
within the city.' 9 Certainly such a holding permits gross disruption of cosharing between riparians in favor of the city, and this even though most
of the water will not be used on riparian land. 0
3. Dam Owners and the Rights of Coriparians
Mill dam acts gave a private eminent domain power to entrepreneurs
who chose to construct dams on streams flowing through riparian lands, a
power to build the dam, flow the lands of an upstream riparian and be free
of any obligation except to pay the value of the flowage right if the damaged
landowner sued in time. More striking, for our purposes, however, is the
express guarantee of appropriative status given to the riparian who first
constructed a dam. No subsequent dam could be erected to the injury of any
mill lawfully existing. 1 As a matter of fact, independent of legislation or
prescriptive rights, American courts have protected the earlier dam against
upstream or downstream structures which threatened to impair the power
potential. 22 Similar protections are accorded hydroelectric dams erected in
accordance with state-granted permits or franchises. 23 ,
Dams often disrupt the natural flow of the stream, especially in dry
periods when water flowing down the stream is held behind the dam to
maintain the head or power potential. Cases from mill dam and logging dam
days willingly (and understandably) sustained as reasonable the complete
retention of the full flow of the river for days at a time. 24 Economic needs
dictated these blows at "natural flow" ideals. Far from protecting a bare
technical right to the natural flow of the watercourse, 25 courts permitted
complete disruption of the flow for sustained periods of time. Nor have the
legislatures failed to react to similar pressures. A Wisconsin statute, for
18. Cowell v. Armstrong, 210 Cal. 218, 290 Pac. 1036 (1930).
19. Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902). The city's withdrawals
so diminished stream flow that plaintiff, a lower riparian, had to shut down his mill at
night.
20. The court did qualify its holding by requiring that the unconsumed sewage
effluent be returned ultimately to the stream, but it apparently was unwilling to protect
riparians between the point of taking and the point of return.
21. See, for example, Wis. Rev. Stats. ch. 56, § 1 (1858).
22. Black's Pomeroy, The Law of Water Rights § 10 (1893) and cases cited. See
also Bissell Chilled Plow Works v. Bend Mfg. Co., 64 Ind. App. 1, 111 N.E. 932 (1916).
23. See Wis. Stats. § 31.06(3) (1959). In considering applications for dams the
commission is to protect "property" which presumably includes prior dams, -at least
so the statute has been interpreted.
24. Coldwell v. Sanderson, 69 Wis. 52, 28 N.W. 232 (1886), aff'd on rehearing,
69 Wis. 57, 33 N.W. 591 (1887). Apfelbacher v. State, 167 Wis. 233, 167 N.W. 244 (1918)
and cases cited.
25. In United States v. Gerlach, 339 U. S. 725 (1950), Mr. justice Jackson said that
such riparianism pressed to the limits of its logic enables one to play dog-in-the-manger.
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example, requires the hydro-dam proprietor to let by, not the entire natural
flow, but as little as 25%o of it. 26
4. Pollution and Correlative Riparian Rights
Use of a watercourse for waste disposal often is a consumptive use in
economic terms. It may deprive others of use opportunities. In fact, a
polluting use may be more serious than a consumptive use which physically
uses up a substantial part of the water, for the reason that the polluting
material may make all the water in a long reach of the watercourse unfit
for any use.
Passing over the unsatisfactory snarl of common law cases which deal
with a riparian's "right" to pollute as opposed to a riparian's right to have the
stream flow by quantity-wise and quality-wise as it was wont to flow, consider
typical statutory pollution controls as they are administered today by state
pollution control agencies. First there are the municipalities which dump raw
or treated sewage in watercourses. There is a marked tendency to treat these
municipal polluters as different in right from private users. Thus, for example,
a Wisconsin irrigator was denied a permit because stream flow might be
reduced to a point where it was not sufficient to flush sewage from a downstream municipality 2 7 (Or is the dumping of municipal sewage effluent a
public right that takes on a priority status comparable to the public right of
navigation?) In any event, many upstream and downstream riparians would
be prepared to argue vociferously that in practical fact their water use rights
in a specified watercourse are being treated as inferior to, not as correlative
and equal to, those of a municipality which is using the stream as a sewer.
Or take the familiar case of several industrial polluters on the same
stream. Assume they are paper mills. The oldest mill is upstream from the
others. With its older facilities sulfate liquor can be treated only to a 42%o
efficiency level. A more modern plant downstream manages a 68% efficiency
level and the most modern and farthest downstream plant of the three achieves
a 75%o treatment level. In actual administration the third plant will be
required on one hand to receive the heavily polluted water from above and
to treat and filter it at considerable cost before it can use it, and on the
other to achieve a substantially higher treatment level for its own liquor
than the upstream mills. Again practical economics makes a shambles of
equal, correlative rights. The older upstream mills have as a practical matter
a prior and "better" right to use of the stream for waste disposal. It is uneconomic to require them to make the heavy investment necessary to bring
their older plants to the level of treatment efficiency it is possible to achieve
in the recently constructed plant. Usually when we think of pollution control
26.
27.

Wis. Stats. § 31.34 (1959).
Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm. 2-WP-1174 (1957).
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we think of the public matched against an individual polluter. An intensive
look at the actual operation of pollution controls as between private water
users on the same watercourse might prove highly instructive not only in
terms of the contrast to correlative sharing which will emerge but also in terms
of the unequal burdens of costs imposed on some users to treat or remove
wastes dumped into the water by others. Further, sometimes the investigator
will find that a particular class of industry has been definitely preferred over
other industrial or agriculture users by permitting it to use a stream for waste
28
disposal almost regardless of consequences to the downstream riparians.
We have segregated the law of water pollution into the nuisance domain.
The time has come to start thinking of waste disposal in terms of priority of
water use? 9
5. Municipal Water Utilities and Rights of Coriparians
The generally accepted "view" is supposed to be that ordinary riparian
rights do not include the privilege of withdrawals for municipal water supply
even though the municipality is a riparian owner.30 Actually courts have often
refused to close down municipal water utilities drawing water from watercourses giving as reasons: (1) failure to show damages; (2) estoppel or laches
or (3) a prescriptive right in the municipality. 3' In Ohio, however, as we
have seen, the court did not feel it necessary to establish rights in municipalities to take water for city purposes by these backdoor devices. Instead the
court flatly announced not only a riparian right in a municipal water utility
but a right superior to that of downstream riparians of the same priority
status as a domestic use privilege. The withdrawal of water by a municipal
utility for city purposes such as street-sprinkling, for industrial purposes and
for household use was thus given a priority status even though most of it was
used on nonriparian land.32 Again, in Minnesota a comparable priority for
municipal use has been established, 33 but this time the priority was based on
the declaration that the withdrawal was a public use and thus superior to
private water power use by a downstream riparian. Probably we can expect
such priority declarations in favor of municipal utilities to grow in number.
28. See Salem Iron Co. v. Hyland, 74 Ohio St. 160, 77 N.E. 751 (1906).
29. See Banks, Priorities for Water Use and Fox, Pollution, the Problem of
Evaluation, both in Proceedings of the National Conference of Water Pollution,
December 12-14, 1960 at pp. 153 and 114 respectively (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education
and Welfare, 1961).
30. See Marquis, Freeman and Heath, The Movement for 'New Water Rights in
the Tennessee Valley States, 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 797, 813 (1955) and Annot., 141 A.L.R.

639 (1942).

31. See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1129 (1931); 141 A.L.R. 639 (1942), and 56 Am. jur.
Waters § 335 (1947).
32. Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902).
33. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Commissioners, 56 Minn.
485, 58 N.W. 33 (1894).
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6. Preferences to Some Industrial Users over Others

In Minnesota an irrigator who gets a water use permit is supposed to use
the water on the 40-acre parcel, or government lot lapped by the water.33a
There seems to be no comparable limitation applied to permits for industrial
use generally and certainly not for mining use in particular.3 4 Water may be
withdrawn from the watercourse and transported to the mine located on nonriparian land, lying perhaps a great distance from the water source. Obviously
it is easier to bring the water to the mine than the mine to the water.
In Wisconsin, irrigators cannot get permits to withdraw from streams
until they have first received written consents from hydroelectric power plant
owners below; a dramatic grant of appropriative status to power companies
of the whole flow of the river.3 5 But the appropriative "right" is good only
against those who wish to irrigate or to make agricultural uses of the water.
Industrial and municipal users may withdraw water without permits and
0
without power company consents.A
Again, irrigators in Wisconsin were, by administrative adjudication,
restricted in their use of water to "riparian land" defined by the strict source
of title test, namely that parcel lapped by the water and located in the watershed and which has come down to the present owner in an uninterrupted chain
of title from the government patent.ar The state legislature has twice permitted
use of such permit water for irrigation of land contiguous to the riparian land,
but only for temporary periods.38 In the meantime, the legislature passed a
liberal permit law permitting withdrawals over long terms for the processing
of low grade iron ores at perhaps great distances from the water source,
possibly even in a different watershed.39
33a. By M.SA. § 105.38 (1959) et seq. permits are required for all withdrawals
except for domestic uses. The system is administered by the Division of Waters,
Conservation Department. See the division's files PA. 57-161; 57-197 and 58-268. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has never reviewed this administrative interpretation of the
permit statutes.
34. See M.S.A. §§ 105.46 and 105.64 (1959). These mining use permits in Minnesota
are indeterminate. In Wisconsin the permits are issued for such periods "as is necessary
to permit the mining to exhaustion." Wis. Stats. § 107.05(4) (1959). Here is an interesting
attempt in a riparian state to assure a water user a fixed quantity of water for a fixed
period of time.
35. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Public Service Commission, 8 Wis. 2d 582,
99 N.W.2d 821 (1959) interpreting Wis. Stats. § 30.18 (1959).
36. Wisconsin's permit law applies only to agricultural or irrigation uses. Wis. Stats.
§ 30.18(1) (1959).
37. The irrigation permit system under Wis. Stats. § 30.18 (1959) is administered
by the state Public Service Commission. It chose the "source of title" test in preference
to the more generous "unity of title" test under which a riparian may add to his
riparian holdings by acquiring contiguous land in the watershed. See Modjeska,
Wisconsin's Water Diversion Law: A Study of Administrative Case Law, 1959 Wis. L.
Rev. 279, 292-293. On these "tests" for determining riparian tracts, see Note, 27 Mich. L.
Rev. 479 (1929).
38. Wis. Stats. § 31.14(8) (1957), expired Jan. 1, 1959 and Wis. Stats. § 30.18(5)
(1959) expired Jan. 1, 1961.
39. Wis. Stats. § 107.05 (1959).
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One more illustration. For several generations nonriparian bog lands in
Wisconsin have been supplied with great quantities of water through ditches
from watercourses for the growing and harvesting of cranberries. 40 The
supreme court of the state has been careful to avoid discussing the validity of
these arrangements, long authorized by the so-called cranberry statutes. 41
I do not want here to pass judgment on any of these contrasts in use
rights. There may be bases upon which they can be rationally explained. The
point is merely that they hardly present a rounded and ordered picture of
correlative sharing. Rather the law of water use in these states, and I'm sure
comparable contrasts can be found in others, present jagged priority points
pushed out by economic interest groups over time.
7. Preferences Assured by Land Use Zoning
Local governments can by zoning regulate the use of riparian land and
thereby restrict the use of water on such land. Assume that land in X City
along a river or lake is zoned, most of it for single family residential use, a
small part of it for industrial use. In the residential zone landowners no longer
have their common-law rights to make any reasonable commercial, agricultural
or industrial use of the water. Landowners in the industrial zone have in effect
been granted an exclusive right to make industrial uses of water as against their
coriparians in the residential zone.
Again, in some states, including my own, agricultural uses have been zoned
out of forested areas. Riparians whose lands are located in forest zones are
barred from establishing irrigation enterprises to the advantage of coriparians
42
who are located on unzoned reaches of the river.
True, in most instances, the zoning was established, not as a water use
regulatory measure, but to regulate shore and other lands. Nevertheless, the
effect has been seriously to limit use privileges of some riparians and thereby
to enhance the privileges of others.
Only two court decisions have been found which discuss the subject. In
Peneleit v. Dudas4 3 the defendant, a riparian, began to fill in along his shore
in accordance with a permit. After reclaiming 225 feet of land he started a
boat livery on the new land. Zoning prohibited commercial uses. The city
sued to enjoin operation of the boat livery. The defendant claimed (a) that
the filled land was not subject to the zoning ordinance and (b) that if it was
subject the ordinance was unconstitutional as an undue interference with his
riparian rights. The Connecticut Supreme Court brushed aside the defenses
40. Wis. L. ch. 40 (1867), now Wis. Stats. §§ 94.26-94.32 (1959).
41. Ibid. See Cranberry Creek Drainage Dist. v. Elm Lake Cranberry Co., 170 Wis.
362, 174 N.W. 554 (1919) and Ramsdale v. Foote, 55 Wis. 557, 13 N.W. 557 (1882).
Prescriptive rights now probably protect most cranberry water withdrawals.
42. See Saltoun, Role of Local Government in Water Law, 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 117, 135.
43. 141 Conn. 413, 106 A.2d 479 (1954).
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and granted the injunction, saying: "To the extent that by zoning regulations
a municipality may limit the uses to be made of property generally, it may
44
also by zoning regulations limit the exercise of riparian rights."
The second case 45 arose in a Minnesota federal district court. Plaintiffs
owned riparian lands on a lake. They planned to use the land for a boat
livery, but before they could do so this use was forbidden by a village zoning
ordinance and the plaintiff's land was placed in a residential zone. Again the
court upheld the ordinance against constitutional attack. The fact that the
plaintiff's land was of less value in a residential zone was not controlling, nor
was the riparian character of the tract.
Thus in very real and dramatic ways cosharing equality among riparians
has been disrupted by zoning ordinances in many places for many years. The
significance of this fact when courts approach problems of constitutionality of
newer statutes which allocate water as such may be great. After all, zoning
ordinances frequently take privileges of use from one group of landowners
and give them to others. Water use regulations which do the same, even to
the extent of taking privileges of use from riparians and giving them to nonriparians may find support in the numerous cases upholding the basic
constitutionality of zoning.
CONCLUSION

These scattered illustrations suggest that a description of "riparian
water laws" in many of our states is a far more complicated task than would
appear from the repeated quotations of repetition-smoothed, rounded phrases
about reasonble use, equality of right, and correlative cosharing. Actually
it is more difficult and complicated than I have made it appear. I have left
out of account the appropriation-like claims to public rights which impinge on
private riparians whose lands border navigable waters in various states.
Formerly these were merely claims to right of commercial navigation. Now by
judicial 46 or statutory4 7 expansion they have come to be claims of right to
fish, hunt, swim, go boating, admire the scenery or otherwise use the water for
public recreation. When such expansions are accompanied by an increasingly
generous test of "navigability" for purposes of determining which waters are
subject to such public claims, 48 more and more riparians find their rights of
reasonable use subject to greater and greater restrictions.
44. Id. at 417, 106 A.2d 481.
45. Dennis v. Village of Tonka Bay, 64 F. Supp. 214 (D.C. Minn. 1946), aff'd
156 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1946).
46. See Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958
Wis. L. Rev. 335; Muench v. Public Service Commission, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514
(1952); Mentor Harbor Yachting Club, Inc. v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 193, 163
N.W.2d 373 (1959).

47. Burns Ind. § 27-620; Wis. Stats. § 31.06(2) (1959).
48. ". . . capable of floating any boat, skiff or canoe, of the shallowest draft used
for recreational purposes." Muench v. Public Service Commission, 261 Wis, 492, 506,
53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (1952).

